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Introduction
One of the most common problems with health 
care systems around the world is that the cost 
of running them tends to increase at higher 
rate than the rate of infl ation (see Glied & 
Smith, 2013). This has led among others to the 
introduction of visit fees by governments and/or 
public as well as private health care facilities and 
other health care providers. According to the 
last available data health spending is estimated 
to have increased by 1.0% in real terms across 
OECD countries in 2013, up from 0.7% in 2012 
and near-zero growth in 2010. However, growth 
rates in 2013 remained well below pre-crisis 
levels: between 2000 and 2009 average growth 
in health spending reached 3.8% (OECD, 
2015). Co-payments for physician services are 
common in high-income countries and are also 
considered in middle income countries of the 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (Danyliv et 
al., 2013; Paris et al., 2010; 2016). Many high 
income countries increased the level of the 
patient cost sharing between 2000 and 2010 as 
a part of policy measures to reduce the level 
of health care spending (Zare & Anderson, 
2013). In spite of higher levels of cost-sharing, 
out-of-pocket spending as a percentage of total 
spending remained unchanged in most of these 
countries because they instituted programs 
to protect certain categories of individuals. 
They achieved that by setting out-of-pocket 
limits, exempting people with certain chronic 
diseases, or eliminating cost sharing for certain 
demographic groups and low-income people 
(Zare & Anderson, 2013).These fees are meant 
to rationalize the use of the health care system 
and slow the growth of health care expenditures. 
There are also another ways how to rationalize 
a health care delivery system. Those include for 
example the substitution of ambulatory care for 
hospital care and promoting the system of one-
day surgeries (Gavurova & Soltes, 2016). 
Based on law no 261/2007 Coll. (Public 
budgets stabilization act) the regulatory fees 
– afterword referred in the article as visit fees 
were introduced in the Czech Republic as a new 
article 16a and 16b of the law no 48/1997 Coll. 
(Public health insurance act) and come into force 
from 1st January 2008. This fi xed consumer co-
payments on doctors’ visits, hospital stay, use of 
medical emergency rooms and the prescription 
of drugs. The Ministry of Health of the Czech 
Republic argued in 2007 and 2008 (Ministry of 
Health, 2009) that visit fees would discourage 
the consumption of unnecessary care and fees 
will be another source of fi nancing of costly 
care and technologies.
The effectiveness of fees to achieve those 
objectives was widely discussed among general 
public, in academic circles and within policy 
making authorities at national, regional and 
local level with media taking a strong interest in 
the debate (Gavurova & Vagasova, 2016). Fees 
structure was changed several times between 
2008 and 2014, as a result of political decisions 
of the government as well as by decision of the 
Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic (fee 
for hospital stay). Regulatory fees with exception 
of the fee for visit of medical emergency rooms 
were abolished by the amendment to the Public 
health insurance act from 1st January 2015.
The goal of the study is to develop a simple 
demand model of health care services that 
can explain why the demand for health care 
services, and hence overall expenditures on 
health care, can rise with the introduction of 
visit fees based on real data available publicly 
in the Czech Republic.
The model provides an explanation of 
fi ndings that were presented in the paper of 
Dittrich and Stará in 2013. The data used for 
the Dittrich and Stará (2013) analysis were 
published in the offi cial publication of the Czech 
Statistical Offi ce (CZSO) – Results of Health 
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Accounts of the Czech Republic (CZSO, 2013).
Another goal is also fi ll the research and 
publication gap that may be found in the 
domestic academics literature.
1. Literature Review
Some analysis of the fee impact were 
elaborated in the Czech Republic (e.g. Zápal, 
2010; Tučková, Fialová, & Popesko, 2012; 
Krůtilová & Yaya, 2012; Žílová & Votápková, 
2012; Dittrich & Stará, 2013; Pražmová, 2014). 
The papers differ both in methods, data and 
covered time period and thus the outcome 
varies. Krůtilová (2010) argues that effect of user 
fees depends on the type of services; it is very 
strong and persisting regarding luxury services 
(visit of general practitioners in patient home), 
strong with weakening tendency for ordinary 
services (outpatient services, medication) and 
relatively weaker for inpatient services. When 
it comes to gender, user fees infl uenced the 
demand of female patients for care much more 
than male patients. The regulatory effect seems 
to be much weaker among seniors than among 
other observed age groups particularly in the 
second year after the implementation of user 
fees. In other groups (excluding infants) the 
regulatory effect tends to persist. Zápal (2010) 
using child drug consumption as a proxy for 
the number of children’s doctor visits, found 
no effect of the reform. Krůtilová and Yaya 
(2012) found that fees may create fi nancial 
obstacles for some households and restrict the 
desirable consumption of health care. Results 
showed that the health care spending burden of 
households increased from 2.15% of their net 
income to 2.63% in 2008 and to 2.55% in 2009 
after the implementation of user fees. Krůtilová 
and Yaya (2012) noted that the presence of 
pensioners and elderly in a household was the 
factor which increased the overall burden. Žílová 
and Votápková (2012) in their paper presented 
two economic models and their results show 
an insignifi cant effect of the abolition of user 
charges on the number of doctor visits, i.e. 
the probability of visiting a doctor among the 
members of treatment group (children) did not 
signifi cantly change when user charges were 
abolished. Pražmová (2014) research has 
shown that the introduction of fees led to the 
reduction of the total number of doctor visits. 
Sixteen out of twenty-two surveyed specialties 
after 2008 show a statistically signifi cant 
decrease in visits.
Dittrich and Stará (2013) research used 
aggregate data for years 2003 to 2011 (see 
UZIS (2013); CZSO (2014)) on health care 
expenditures and number of visits and the 
authors found that visit fees indeed reduced 
number of outpatient visits on the average by 
2.5% per year, but the lower number of visits 
did not translate to lower insurance system 
expenditures on outpatient care. On the contrary, 
Author(s) Year Findings
Zápal 2010
Using child drug consumption as a proxy for the number of children’s doctor 
visits, found no effect of the reform. On the other hand, the data reveal a short-
term strategic timing effect associated with the policy change. With the policy 
effective since April 2009, there is evidence of a shift in children’s doctor visits 
away from March towards April. However, he was not able to fully disentangle 
the potential confounding effect of the spring vacation and as a result are much 
less convinced of this result.
Krůtilová 2010
The effect of user fees depends on the type of services; it is very strong and 
persisting regarding luxury services (visit of general practitioners in patient 
home), strong with weakening tendency for ordinary services (outpatient 
services, medication) and relatively weaker for inpatient services. When it 
comes to gender, implemented user fees infl uenced the demand of female 
patients much more than male patients. The regulatory effect seems to 
be much weaker among seniors than among other observed age groups 
particularly in the second year after the implementation of user fees. In other 
groups (excluding infants) the regulatory effect tends to persist.
Tab. 1: Regulatory fees in the research evidence in the Czech Republic – Part 1
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Author(s) Year Findings
Tučková, 
Fialová, 
& Popesko
2011
From the health care analysis after the introduction of regulatory fees is clear 
that the introduction of fees has brought far more positive than negative. 
People obviously disagreed with the introduction of fees and still disagree, but 
some are starting to realize the positive impact of regulatory fees. The health 
care system has long been in a bad economic situation and the introduction of 
fees was one of the steps that can help health care, at least a little.
Pražmová 
& Dušek 2011
Research results proved that most respondents are not in favour of area 
cancelation of regulatory fees but they are in favour of modifying them. The 
most acceptable is the regulatory fee for hospital stay per day, on the other 
hand, the worst evaluated is the fee for each item on prescriptions. The 
implemented regulatory fees led to the decrease of visits at the doctor’s with 
28% of respondents.
Krůtilová 
& Yaya 2012
As a part of the health care reform package in 2008, some additional out-of 
pocket payments were introduced, called ‘user (patient) fees’. Furthermore, 
the government intends to increase some user fees in the following years. 
There have been serious discussions between proponents and opponents 
because an increase in out of pocket payments for health care may create 
fi nancial obstacles for some households and restrict the desirable consumption 
of health care. Results showed that the burden of households increased from 
2.15% of their net income to 2.63% in 2008 and to 2.55% in 2009 after the 
implementation of user fees. They noted that the presence of pensioners and 
elderly in a household was the factor which increased the overall burden the 
most and led to catastrophic payments.
Kinkorová 
& Topolčan 2012
The share of private expenditure in the total expenditure on health rose 
particularly after 2008, due to new regulation fees in health services. In 
2010 the private expenditure on health slightly decreased, partly as a result 
of softening of the regulation fees and of stagnant purchasing power of the 
population.
Žílová 
& Votápková 2012
Results of both models calculated by authors consistently show an insignifi cant 
effect of the abolition of user charges on the number of doctor visits, i.e. 
the probability of visiting a doctor among the members of treatment group 
(children) did not signifi cantly change when user charges were abolished.
Pražmová 2014
The research has shown that the established fees have led to a reduction 
of the total number of visits at the doctor’s. Sixteen of twenty-two surveyed 
specialties after 2008 show a statistically signifi cant decrease in visits. Their 
announced cancellation, effective January 1, 2015, is unsystematic step 
according to the author’s meaning.
Pražmová 
& Talpová 2014
The regulatory fees, which were introduced in the Czech Republic on 
01/01/2008 are described in detail. Not only their economic function has been 
emphasized, but also other aspects of the reform, especially the protective 
limit, whose introduction ensures the availability of care for the chronically 
ill and socially disadvantaged patients. The authors follow the evolution of 
the price of all regulatory fees paid by all of the insured individuals of health 
insurance companies in the Czech Republic for the period 2008–2012 and 
the development of the amounts by which the protective limit was exceeded. 
A comparison of patients’ participation was carried out in selected European 
Union countries, where the system has been in place for many years, together 
with other protective mechanisms in order to provide health care for patients in 
need.
Source: own compilation based on reference literature
Tab. 1: Regulatory fees in the research evidence in the Czech Republic – Part 2
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total expenditure grew faster after the 
introduction of visit fees. While real billings per 
visit grew on average 4% per year before fees 
were introduced, after the introduction of fees 
real billings per visit grew on average 8.3% per 
year. In other words, the decline in the number 
of visits was more than offset by the shift to 
more numerous and expensive procedures 
during the visit (Dittrich & Stará, 2013).
1.2 Lesson Learned from Abroad
The foreign literature on the effect of visit fees 
on health care expenditures has concentrated 
on the impact on the number of visits. Kim et 
al. (2005) found a fairly small decline in the 
number of visits following an increase in the visit 
fees. Chiappori et al. (1998) reports a negligible 
effect on the number of offi ce visits after the 
visit fees are introduced. Schreyögg and 
Grabka (2010) reported that the introduction of 
visit fees in Germany in 2004 for the fi rst visit in 
each quarter had little impact on the number of 
visits. While these studies all show a negative 
if small impact on the visits frequency with the 
introduction of visit fees they do not consider the 
impact that introduction of visit fees will have on 
other components of health care expenditure. 
The issue is also elaborated in Paul and Nielson 
(2014). An exception is a study by Jung (1998) 
that does not consider the impact of visit fees 
on visits in isolation, but reports an increase in 
intensity per visit.
The paper written by Aaltonen et al. (2013) 
explore trends and income related differences 
in out-of-pocket (OOP) costs for prescription 
and over-the-counter medicines in Finland 
in 1985-2006. They conclude that all patients 
faced increasing OOP payments for medicines 
throughout the study period, but the lowest 
income groups experienced largest relative 
increase in OOP payments. Their results 
suggest that savings achieved by increasing 
the patients’ share of costs was accompanied 
by steeper growth in OOP costs and wider 
differences between income groups. Cost 
containment measures targeted at prices, on 
the other hand, coincided with stabilized OOP 
costs and decreasing dispersion between the 
income quintiles. (Aaltonen et al., 2013). The 
study by Baji et al. (2012) focuses on the short-
term effects of the introduction of the visit fee in 
Hungary in 2007 on informal patient payments. 
According to the results, 9% of the patients 
paid informally during their last visit to GP 
(2 Euros on average), 14% paid informally for 
specialist care (35 Euros on average) and 50% 
paid informally for hospitalization (58 Euros 
on average). They fi nd a signifi cant reduction 
in the probability of informal payments only for 
elderly patients in the case of in-patient care. 
Their results suggest that informal payments 
are widely spread in Hungary, especially in in-
patient care.
The short run potential of the introduction 
of the visit fee to reduce informal payments 
seems to be minor (Baji et al., 2012). According 
to the Laba et al. (2015) in Australia exists 
growing body of evidence highlighting the 
substantial economic burden faced by 
individuals and families as a result of out-of-
pocket costs for health care and their effects 
on healthcare access, outcomes and long-term 
healthcare costs. It is argued that a compulsory 
minimum co-payment for GP consultations will 
exacerbate these burdens and signifi cantly 
undermine the tenets of universal access in 
Australian Medicare.
Ma and Nolan (2016) used the longitudinal 
data from Ireland and found that introducing 
user fees for healthcare results in a signifi cant 
decrease in GP visiting, while the removal of 
user fees results in a proportionately smaller, 
but still signifi cant increase in GP visiting. 
They found little evidence of offset effects on 
other types of healthcare utilization that is, 
introducing user fees, principally for GP care, 
does not result in a signifi cant change in the 
utilization of other types of healthcare such as 
hospital care. However, removing user fees for 
healthcare results in a signifi cant increase in 
the number of medications dispensed.
1.3 Elasticity of Health Care Demand
Consumers have demand for health but cannot 
directly purchase it. They must purchase health 
care services that are used to produce health. 
The ideas that demand for health care is derived 
from the demand for health were fi rst discussed 
by Grossman (1972). Regardless of empirical 
methods and data sources, the price elasticity of 
demand for the health care is found to be relatively 
inelastic. Although the price elasticity of demand 
for health care is relatively low (as Ringel et al. 
(2002) argue in large part because there are few 
close substitutes for medical services), certain 
types of care are found to be somewhat more price 
sensitive. Preventive care and pharmacy benefi ts 
are among those medical services with larger 
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price elasticities. The fi nding that the demand for 
preventive care is more price sensitive than the 
demand for other types of care is not surprising. 
The number of available substitutes for a product 
is a major determinant of demand elasticity (see 
Ringel et al., 2002). As Zhou et al. (2011) and 
others (see the discussion in Ringel et al. (2002)) 
argue the elasticity of demand measures the 
responsiveness of demand for health care to 
changes in price or income.
Estimating the demand for health care 
services is a complex process that must 
consider both the consumer’s response to 
changes in price and the provider’s ability to 
induce demand (Weiner, 1993). Physicians 
may change their patterns of practice, perhaps 
prescribing more intense treatments, when 
increased cost-sharing leads to lower demand 
for their services. Furthermore, physicians act 
as an agent once care is initiated by the patient 
and may not consider price in the same way as 
the patient would (Ringel et al., 2002).
2. Empirical Findings
The paper of Dittrich and Stará (2013) used 
the aggregate data for years 2003 to 2011 
on health care outpatient expenditures and 
the number of visits in the Czech Republic. 
They found that visit fees indeed reduced 
number of outpatient visits on the average by 
2.5% per year, but the lower number of visits 
did not translate to lower insurance system 
expenditures on the outpatient care. To the 
contrary, total expenditure grew faster after the 
introduction of visit fees. While real billings per 
visit grew on average 4% per year before fees 
were introduced, after the introduction of fees 
real billings per visit grew on average 8.3% per 
year. Below we introduce a simple demand 
model for health care services that can explain 
the observed acceleration in the growth of the 
outpatient expenditures in the Czech Republic 
after regulation fees were introduced.
3. Model
The simple demand model of health care 
services is presented that can explain why the 
demand for health care services, and hence 
overall expenditures on health care, can rise 
with the introduction of visit fees was developed 
with the following parameters.
Let P be the price index of health care 
services and let Q be the quantity of health care 
services. Then the consumer problem is to
Max. U(Q) s.t. PQ=E,  (1)
where E is expenditures on health care services. 
The model outlined in equation (1) describes 
the demand side of the health care market for 
in a private system where the consumer pays 
for health care services directly to the doctor. In 
a system where consumers do not pay doctors 
directly, health care expenditures would likely 
spin out of control since neither the doctors 
nor the consumers are paying for health care 
services.
Suppose the government wants to slow the 
growth of health care expenditures by imposing 
a visit fee on outpatient visits. In other words, 
the government charges consumers on the 
basis of a price per visit. Defi ne V as doctor 
visits, and let
Q=γV (2)
where γ is health care “intensity” per visit. Defi ne 
P* is the price of a visit. The introduction of 
a visit fee P* has increased a component price 
of P, but has left other components unchanged. 
Expenditure on health care services is given by 
the identities
E=PQ=PγV.  (3)
Defi ne εQP* as the elasticity of demand 
of health services with respect to the price of 
visits, P*, εVP* as the elasticity of demand of 
visits with respect to P* and εγP* as the elasticity 
of demand of visit intensity with respect to P*. 
Differentiating the natural logarithm of equation 
(2) by the natural logarithm of P* then
εQP* = εVP* + εγP* , (4)
if εQP*>0 in equation (4) then health care 
expenditures will rise with the introduction of 
visit fees. From equation (4), the elasticity of 
demand for health care with respect to P* εQP*, 
is the sum of two elasticities: 1) the own price 
elasticity for number of visits (εVP*); and 2) the 
cross price elasticity of visit intensity (εγP*).
4. Results
The own price elasticity for number of visits 
is negative and it is this elasticity that the 
government probably had in mind when it 
introduced the visit fee as a method to reduce 
health care expenditures E. However, as 
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equation (4) demonstrates, the total effect on 
the demand for health care services Q resulting 
from an increase the visit fee depends not only 
on the effect the visit fee will have on visits 
V, but also the effect the visit fee has on visit 
intensity γ. The intensity elasticity measures the 
effect a change in the price of visits has on the 
visit intensity and, given equation (3), is positive, 
since visits and visit intensity are substitutes. 
If the cross price of intensity elasticity (εγP*) is 
elastic, and the own price elasticity of visits 
(εVP*) is inelastic, then the overall effect of the 
introduction of visit fees is to increase the 
demand for health care services Q. Stated 
more generally, the elasticity of health care 
services will be positive with the introduction of 
visit fees whenever the cross price elasticity of 
health care intensity with respect to the price 
of visits is larger in absolute value than the 
own price elasticity of visits with respect to the 
price of visits. A graphical representation of the 
demand shift for visit intensity is given by Fig. 1. 
The demand for visit intensity rises from D1 
to D2. Since the price of visit intensity has not 
changed, the quantity of visit intensity increases 
from Q1 to Q2, increasing overall health care 
expenditures by P (Q2-Q1).
The effect of visit fee on overall expenditures 
on health care depends on the sign of
dlnE/dlnP*=dlnP/dlnP*+ εQP*,  (5)
with expenditures rising whenever (5) is greater 
than zero. The fi rst term on the right hand 
side of equation (5) is positive and measures 
the increase in the overall price of health care 
services P resulting from an increase in the 
introduction of a visit fee P*. If the price of visits 
P*, is a small component of the overall price of 
health care services P or the price change in P* 
itself is small, this effect is likely to be small. In 
contrast, the discussion until now has focused 
on why εQP* is positive, and so charging a visit 
fee will increase total expenditures on health 
care from equation (5).
Fig. 1 coupled with equation (5) demonstra-
tes why the introduction of visit fees may not 
lead to a decline in health care expenditures. 
An unambiguous way to lower the demand for 
health care services is to increase the price 
of P. Instead, the government increases one 
component of P, the visit fee P*, leaving the rest 
of the components (summarized in the price 
of intensity in Fig. 1) unchanged. Therefore, 
consumers shift from visits to visit intensity, 
resulting in a rise in health care expenditures. 
This shift between number of visits and visit 
Fig. 1: Price and quantity of visit intensity
Source: own
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intensity has also been noted in health care 
literature by Jung (1998) and in the all-you-can-
eat food literature by Just and Wansink (2010).
Visits and visit intensity are substitutes. 
The introduction of a visit fee heightens the 
awareness of this substitution in the mind of 
the consumer and increases the desire of 
consumers for more health care intensity. One 
can imagine the thought process of consumers 
when they are required to pay a visit fee: “Now 
that I have to pay for my visit, I want to get my 
money’s worth in terms of more services per 
visit”. One can also imagine the thought process 
of doctors when confronted with consumers 
who want better visit intensity: “Well in that 
case, we should do more testing, monitoring, 
etc. each time you are here”. It could actually 
be in the reverse with the doctor saying to the 
patient something like: “Since you will visit less 
often, we need to make sure we do more and 
better testing, monitoring etc. with each visit”. 
This is an example of the supplier induced 
demand e.g. Evans (1974). The result could 
easily mean an increase in overall health care 
expenditures.
The visit reservation price is the visit price at 
which the health care consumer would quit going 
to the doctor entirely. The discussion up to this 
point assumes that the health care consumer will 
respond to an increase the visit fee by reducing 
visits but that these visits are not reduced to zero. 
For some consumers, a doctor visit reservation 
price is reached so that this consumer will quit 
going to the doctor entirely. Given the modest 
size of the visit fees introduced, this reservation 
price is unlikely to be reached for any but the 
poorest health care consumers.
Both visits and visit intensity will fall to zero 
when the reservation price is reached. This 
would lead to an unambiguous fall in health 
care expenditures, at least in the short term. 
In this case the introduction of a visit fee is 
effective in reducing health care expenditures. 
However the targeting of its poorest citizens 
to ensure the effectiveness of its policy to 
reduce health care expenditures through the 
reduction of all (except perhaps emergency) 
health care services to zero is unlikely to be 
the intended purpose of the introduction of visit 
fees. Over the longer term, since these health 
care consumers receive no ongoing medical 
treatment, monitoring and advice, their health 
may suffer and put preventable costs on the 
health care services in the future.
5. Discussion
The proposed model explains fi nding by Dittrich 
and Stará (2013) of the acceleration in billing 
for outpatient services after visit fees were 
introduced. On the other hand, as the majority 
of fees were abolished from 1st January 
2015 the possibility of further verifi cation is 
therefore applicable for data from 2014 only. 
The government needs a rationing device to 
control expenditures. It chooses to increase 
the visit price to consumers as a rationing 
device. In doing so, the government assumes 
that consumers do not respond to the increase 
in the visit price by changing visit intensity, 
which of course they do. If the price of visits 
rises and there is no change in the price of 
the rest of health care goods and services, 
then consumers will demand more health care 
services per visit. The increase in expenditures 
on these services may more than offset the 
decline in expenditures resulting from fewer 
visits, rendering the introduction of a visit fee 
a counterproductive rationing device to control 
health care expenditures.
The main factors that determine health 
care expenditure are technology (highest 
share), administrative cost, changes in 
fi nancing, healthcare prices, increasing life 
expectancy and ageing of the population and 
personal income growth. The assumptions 
vary considerably but the technology have 
highest share in all researches done in 
previous years. The healthcare prices have 
share on increases from 11-22% according to 
the research evidence (for details e.g. Ivlev, 
Kneppo, & Barták, 2014).
We have to take into account also that 
physicians may change their patterns of 
practice, perhaps prescribing more intense 
treatments, when increased cost-sharing 
leads to lower demand for their services. 
Furthermore, physicians act as an agent once 
care is initiated by the patient and may not 
consider price in the same way as the patient 
would. There is evidence that ineffectiveness is 
also the attribute of supply side and third party 
payers (health insurance funds).
Conclusion
The model shows that the demand for health 
care services will increase with an increase in 
the price of visits when the cross price elasticity 
of demand for visit intensity outweighs the own 
price elasticity of visits. The introduction of a visit 
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fee is a counterproductive rationing device for 
health care services if it rations a component 
of overall health care services with a low own 
price elasticity of demand without rationing 
a substitute variable (visit intensity) with 
a higher cross elasticity of demand. Thus, the 
introduction of a visit fee may induce a sense 
of entitlement for further health care services 
per visit on the part of consumers, leading to 
an increase in overall health care expenditures. 
The model suggests that if the government 
wants to use the visit fee as a rationing device 
to lower health care expenditure, then it needs 
to fi nd a way to ration also the visit intensity 
both from the point of view of patients as well 
as medical doctors.
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Abstract
THE VISIT FEES AND ITS INFLUENCE ON OVERALL HEALTH EXPENDITURES 
– THE CASE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC
J. Stephen Clark, Ludwig O. Dittrich, Dana Stará, Miroslav Barták
The goal of the paper is to develop a simple demand model of health care services that can explain 
why the demand for health care services, and hence overall expenditures on health care, can rise 
with the introduction of visit fees based on real data available publicly in the Czech Republic. One 
of the most common problems with the costs of health care systems around the world is that they 
tend to increase expenditures at a rate that is greater than the rate of infl ation. This has led to the 
introduction of visit fees by governments and/or public, private health care facilities and other health 
care providers. These fees are meant to rationalize the use of the health care system and slow the 
growth of health care expenditures. The Ministry of Health of the Czech Republic introduced from 
1st January 2008 visit fees as a way to slow the growth of health care expenditures. On the contrary, 
total health care expenditures increased after the introduction of visit fees. A model of visits and 
visit intensity is developed, where visits and visit intensity are substitutes. The model shows that the 
demand for health care services will increase with an increase in the price of visits when the cross 
price elasticity of demand for visit intensity outweighs the own price elasticity of visits. The fees 
were abolished with the exception of fee for emergency room visit from 2015. The introduction of 
a visit fee is a counterproductive rationing device for health care services if it rations a component of 
overall health care services with a low own price elasticity of demand without rationing a substitute 
variable (visit intensity) with a higher cross elasticity of demand. Thus, the introduction of a visit 
fee may induce a sense of entitlement for further health care services per visit on the part of 
consumers, leading to an increase in overall health care expenditures.
Key Words: Health care, demand price elasticity, visit fees, service intensity, rationing device.
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